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Footnotes 
1. Trial transcript cites are from: Trial Transcript, 182, State of New
Jersey v. McKinley Cromedy, Ind. No. 1243- 07-93 (N.J. Super. Ct.
July 27, 1994) (on file with the author).  A discussion of this case
and a more detailed discussion of eyewitness misidentifications
and postconviction rulings in the first 250 DNA-exoneration cases
appears in my book. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011).
2. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999).
3. I have made the data from these 250 exoneree cases and appen-
dices to the book available online at a resource webpage:
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/librarysite/garrett_innocent.htm.
“[T]he evidence will show, not that she’s a liar, but that she’s
mistaken, that her identification is wrong and it’s a misidenti-
fication,” McKinley Cromedy’s defense lawyer told the jury in
the opening statement.1
The victim, a white college student, had been raped by a
black man in her apartment. A few days later, she had helped
a police artist draw a composite sketch of a black man with a
full face and a moustache.  She looked at thousands of pho-
tos of black men who had been arrested. One of those photos
was of Cromedy.  In fact, the police had him in mind as a sus-
pect because he had been seen in the area, but she did not
identify him.
Almost eight months later, she saw Cromedy crossing the
street. She thought he was her attacker, partly because of his
appearance but also because of his unusual way of walking due
to a limp, “a swagger,” as she put it. She called the police, who
called her back fifteen minutes later to say that they had picked
up a man matching her description. She then went to the
police station, where police asked her to identify Cromedy,
standing in a room behind one-way glass.  She positively iden-
tified Cromedy as her attacker.
The police officer explained, “I’ve had a lot of experience
with identifications and I’m not going to lead somebody. I
asked her to see if she recognized this person.” Yet there was
no justification for conducting an inherently suggestive
showup in which she viewed Cromedy one-on-one, rather
than conduct a lineup.
Cromedy’s lawyer argued that the identification was
improper, saying that the showup was “like true or false, and
to me that is about as suggestive as a procedure you can have.
. . . She knows somebody was picked up. What could be more
suggestive?” 
The trial judge ruled that the identification was admissible,
emphasizing, “she was very certain of her identification,” and
noting that her composite drawing looked like Cromedy and
that “Mr. Cromedy has a very, very unique style of walking. It’s
a combination of a swagger and a roll.” 
At trial, the victim pointed to Cromedy in the courtroom
and agreed she was “absolutely sure” he was her attacker.
Cromedy’s defense lawyer then asked for a special jury
instruction, asking the jury to consider “whether the cross-
racial nature of the identification has affected the accuracy of
the witness’s original perception and/or accuracy of a subse-
quent identification.” The trial judge denied the request. 
Cromedy was convicted. On appeal, though, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed his conviction. The court ruled in
1999 that “forty years” of empirical studies documented a risk
of heightened error when white eyewitnesses try to identify
black subjects. The court noted that some courts, such as in
California, Massachusetts, and Utah, had permitted such
instructions. The court ruled that under the facts of his case, it
was “reversible error not to have given an instruction that
informed the jury about the possible significance of the cross-
racial identification factor, a factor the jury can observe in
many cases with its own eyes.”2
The court reversed McKinley Cromedy’s conviction without
knowing that he was in fact innocent. After the ruling, how-
ever, the prosecution agreed to conduct DNA tests. The results
excluded him and he was exonerated. The victim later com-
mented, “I couldn’t believe that I was wrong.”
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
In my book, Convicting the Innocent, published in 2011 by
Harvard University Press, I examined the cases of the first 250
people exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.  With some
difficulty, by contacting lawyers, court clerks, and court
reporters around the country, I assembled the original trial
records from their cases.  I was able to obtain 88% of their trial
transcripts  (207 trial transcripts from the 234 that had a trial),
as well as materials from hearings for 11 of the 16 who had
pleaded guilty.3 I wanted to know what went wrong.  Why
were these people convicted?  
When I examined the records, I learned that cases like
Cromedy’s were not idiosyncratic.  In fact, cases like his were
quite typical.  Most DNA exonerees had eyewitnesses evidence
at their trials, since so many of the cases involving DNA post-
conviction were rape cases.  Thus, 76% had eyewitnesses
misidentify them (190 of 250 exonerees).  More to the point,
eyewitnesses typically described how police used suggestive
procedures, like the showup used in Cromedy’s case.  All but a
handful of the eyewitnesses were certain at the time of trial.
An eyewitness in Steven Avery’s case testified, “[T]here is
absolutely no question in my mind.” In Thomas Doswell’s case,
the victim testified, “This is the man or it is his twin brother”
and “That is one face I will never forget . . . .” In Dean Cage’s
case, the victim was “a hundred percent sure.” In Willie Otis
“Pete” Williams’s case, the victim said she was “one hundred
and twenty” percent sure. 
Cromedy was one of 74 black or Hispanic exonerees
misidentified by a white eyewitness, and almost half of the
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identifications were cross-racial.  As the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted, studies have long shown how cross-racial identi-
fications are especially error-prone.  
Decades of social science can tell us much more about what
went wrong in Cromedy’s case.  Not only was he convicted
based on a cross-racial identification, but as discussed, police
used a suggestive showup identification. The eyewitness had
earlier seen Cromedy’s picture but had been unable to identify
him.  Yet her confidence had increased by the time of trial,
when she was absolutely sure, though she was wrong.  I saw
exactly the same pattern in other cases of people later cleared
by DNA tests.  Just as social scientists would have predicted
based on upwards of 2,000 studies, as well as meta-analyses
and field studies, suggestive lineup procedures can cement
eyewitness mistakes.  Almost without exception, the eyewit-
nesses who misidentified innocent people were completely
confident at trial, though they were wrong.  Most had earlier
been uncertain, when first shown the defendant’s photo at an
array, or seeing the defendant at a lineup.  In 57% of the trials
studied (92 of 161 cases), witnesses reported they had not
been certain at the earlier identifications, or identified other
people.  
Where did that false confidence come from? In 78% of those
trials (125 of the 161 cases involving eyewitnesses in which
trial records could be located), there was evidence that police
contaminated the identifications. Many of those eyewitnesses
were asked to pick out the suspect using suggestive methods
long known to increase risks of error. Police made remarks that
indicated who should be selected, used unnecessary showups,
or used lineups that made the defendant stand out. 
NEW JERSEY’S RESPONSE 
In response to such exonerations, New Jersey began a pro-
ject of revamping its criminal-procedure rules. The New Jersey
Attorney General’s Office issued guidelines to all law-enforce-
ment agencies in the state requiring that detailed procedures
be followed when eyewitnesses are asked to identify a suspect.4
These guidelines were a landmark reform. New Jersey became
the first state in the country to adopt double-blind lineups.
That simple reform, having an officer administer the lineup
who does not know which one is the suspect, is the most
important improvement to lineups.  Feedback from police,
even unintentional can dramatically increase the confidence of
an eyewitness, even when the eyewitness is wrong.5 It is easy
to adopt, and smaller departments that cannot spare another
administrator can easily make a lineup blind by using the
“folder method”: simply placing the photos in folders and
shuffling them, with a few blanks, so that the administrator
cannot see inside the folders
that the witness is examining.  
New Jersey adopted a second
key reform: sequential photo
arrays, showing photos one at a
time to prevent “comparison
shopping.”  More recent field
studies have shown how
sequential lineups reduce false
identifications of “fillers” in
lineups, making them an impor-
tant improvement for police,
whose witnesses lose credibility
if they identify fillers.6
Eyewitnesses were to be instructed that the perpetrator might
not appear in the lineup, along with other improvements. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court did more.  In 2006, the
court required that police similarly record or document all eye-
witness identifications.  The court noted, “Misidentification is
widely recognized as the single greatest cause of wrongful con-
victions in this country.”7 In 2007, the court addressed jury
instructions. The court adopted a Model Jury Instruction
charging all jurors not to rely on “the confidence level” of an
eyewitness, at least not “standing alone.”8
Finally, the court asked that a special master explore some-
thing more fundamental: the U.S. Supreme Court’s Manson v.
Brathwaite test9 for evaluating admissibility of eyewitness iden-
tifications.The master held hearings, with the participation of
the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, Attorney General,
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Innocence
Project. He recommended that the court adopt a new test for
evaluating eyewitness identification evidence and require pre-
trial hearings to evaluate all eyewitness identifications.10
In the landmark decision of New Jersey v. Henderson,11 the
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a comprehensive social-
science framework for evaluating eyewitness-identification
evidence. Detailed jury instructions are now required to edu-
cate jurors on the factors that affect an eyewitnesses’ memory.
While the U.S. Supreme Court in Perry v. New Hampshire
declined to further regulate eyewitness identifications, albeit in
a case with marginal facts involving an identification not
“arranged” by police, reform is now occurring in the states.12
Most recently, the Oregon Supreme Court in Oregon v. Lawson13
abandoned the Manson test and recommended careful exam-
iniation of factors informed by social science. As I describe in
my book, Convicting the Innocent, other states have enacted
statutes to improve lineup procedures or have adopted detailed
model policies for police departments to follow.  
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New Jersey now provides a
leading model for the coun-
try, beginning with improving
the lineups themselves, but
extending to how judges can
ensure that more accurate
identification evidence is pre-
sented in their courtrooms—
and it all began with the terri-
ble lesson learned from the
case of McKinley Cromedy.
HARMLESS ERROR 
One of the central questions that I posed when examining
the cases of these innocent people was this:  Why was it so hard
for innocent people to challenge their flawed convictions?  I did
not just study trials, but also all of the claims that exonerees
asserted postconviction before they obtained the DNA tests that
ultimately led to the vacatur of their convictions.
One of the most difficult tasks of a judge is deciding which
mistakes matter and which do not.  Legendary California
Supreme Court Chief Judge Roger Traynor poetically described
the plight of the appellate or postconviction judge confronted
by thousands and thousands of claims of trial errors: 
Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling
through it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless
procession. Many are plainly harmless; some appear omi-
nously harmful. Some, for all the benign appearance of
their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of follow-
ers that deplete trials of fairness.14
The cases brought by DNA exonerees, who we now know to
have been innocent, provided me with a unique opportunity to
examine how judges sort out harmful errors from the harm-
less. When I reviewed the records in these unusual cases of
DNA exonerees, I asked myself why the judges hearing these
cases on appeal or habeas review did not correct these errors,
long before DNA testing entered the picture. 
Of course, asking that the question assumes that these peo-
ple could somehow show a judge that they were innocent even
without getting DNA testing. But at a more fundamental level,
the question assumes that after a conviction, higher courts will
review the trial record and look for mistakes, to make sure that
a miscarriage of justice did not occur.  That second assumption
is not a very good one. Judge Jerome Frank and Barbara Frank,
in their 1957 book about wrongful convictions, called the
notion that the court on appeal will correct the mistaken con-
viction of the innocent the “Upper Court Myth.” They pointed
out that the appellate court “knows no more than the jury and
the trial judge” and has a limited role. It is “obliged to accept
the jury’s verdict” and must typically accept the testimony of
the witnesses as true rather than reconsider the case based on
a cold record.15
In the decades after they wrote, a criminal-procedure revo-
lution has changed the face of appellate and postconviction lit-
igation, creating a host of new avenues to challenge a convic-
tion, but still, very few cases are ever reversed on appeal and
postconviction review—no more than 1% or 2%.  While Judge
Henry Friendly famously and provocatively asked in a 1970 law
review article why innocence is not more relevant to habeas
review, innocence remains salient mostly when denying relief
by finding error harmless;16 the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
recognize, except hypothetically, a claim of actual innocence.
The exonerees, who in hindsight we know are actually
innocent, did earn high numbers of reversals—a 13% reversal
rate—in criminal appeals and postconviction proceedings they
brought before they obtained the DNA testing that exonerated
them. I then discovered that this 13% reversal rate was not
unusual. When I compared them to a matched group of defen-
dants with reported decisions involving similar crimes, years,
and states, I discovered that the reversal rate in these
exonerees’ cases was no different from the reversal rates of
other rape and murder trials. The implication is that rape and
murder trials may simply produce higher rates of reversible
errors. Because courts issued written decisions in about two-
thirds of the cases (165 of 250 cases, or 66%), combing
through this mass of opinions does not tell us what happened
in every case, but it can allow us to make some generalizations
about how courts judged innocence.
CHALLENGING TRIAL EVIDENCE
Cromedy’s case was unusual in that he actually challenged
the eyewitness identification in his case, and his case was
extremely unusual in that he was able to earn a reversal even
before he obtained DNA testing to prove his innocence.  Of the
124 exonerees who were convicted on the basis of an eyewit-
ness identification and obtained a judge’s written decision,
only 56% challenged the eyewitness identification (70 of 124
cases).  Only 7% were successful (5 of 70 cases). Similarly, only
32% of those who had forensic evidence at trial challenged the
forensic evidence (36 of 112 cases) and 17% succeeded (6 of
36 cases). Only 36% challenged informant testimony (16 of 45
cases) and 25% succeeded (4 of 16 cases). The largest propor-
tion, 59%, challenged false confessions (13 of 22 cases), but
only 8% had any success (just 1 of 13 cases). 
I discuss all of these cases in greater detail in my book, and
in a law-review article titled Judging Innocence.17 The cases
involving forensic evidence are troubling, where invalid foren-
sic analysis and false statistics were apparent just from reading
the trial transcripts; still worse, many of the traditional tech-
niques used at the time were invalid and unreliable.  Yet judges
rarely granted relief, failing to screen unscientific forensic tes-
timony at trial and frequently finding error harmless on appeal
or postconviction. 
Take the confession cases, for example.  One would think
that confession evidence would be central at trial and would be
a crucial subject for postconviction challenges.  However, of the
22 innocent people who were convicted based on false confes-
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sions and had written decisions in their cases, only seven raised
Fifth Amendment claims that their confessions were involun-
tary, and three more alleged their confessions were obtained in
violation of Miranda. None of these claims was successful.
The exception among the confession cases—Ronald
Williamson’s case—instead involved an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim, and failures by his lawyer to challenge the
confession, but also a range of failures by his lawyer to chal-
lenge other important evidence in the case.  Indeed, before trial
his lawyer had begged the judge to let him withdraw from the
case. “I can’t represent him Judge; I just can’t do it,” his lawyer
had insisted. “I’m too damned old for it, Judge. I don’t want
anything to do with him, not under any circumstances.”
More representative of the rulings in cases involving false
confessions, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that Alejandro
Hernandez “did not present an argument which convinces us
that he learned the details of the crime contained in his ‘vision’
from law enforcement officers.”18 A series of other courts sim-
ilarly emphasized how detailed the confessions were and how
overwhelming the evidence of guilt was.  Perhaps most
remarkable was Nathaniel Hatchett’s case, in which the judge
convicted him at a bench trial—despite the fact that DNA tests
even at the time excluded him—in the case of a victim raped
by a single person.  Despite the DNA exclusion, which the
judge could not explain, the judge emphasized, “[I]n this case
there is an abundance of corroboration for the statements
made by Mr. Hatchett to the police after his arrest,” which the
judge found “to be of overwhelming importance in determin-
ing the outcome of the trial.”19 His appeal was denied by a
court similarly emphasizing how “the prosecution presented
overwhelming evidence” and how the detectives had “testified
that defendant’s statement included information that only the
perpetrator of the crimes would know,” including facts “fully
corroborative” of the victim’s account.20
Now we know that these false confessions included details
that could only have come from law enforcement.  All but two
of the 40 false confessions that I examined included such
details.  They were contaminated, but judges did not credit
those allegations, failing to believe that police would feed facts
to a compliant suspect.  Absent any complete recording of the
entire interrogations, there was no proof of who said what.
Recantations by these innocent people were disbelieved.   In
response, more and more states and police departments are
requiring videotaping of complete interrogations.  Whether
judges will do more to examine the reliability of confession
statements, however, is another question.  Judges should insist
on a completely recorded and documented interrogation and
examine “fit” and whether, although voluntary, the suspect
could in fact volunteer corroborated information about the
crime.  Otherwise, innocent people may be simply fed the facts
to make their words fit the crime.  Contamination of a confes-
sion can happen unintentionally, even, during complex inter-
rogations using psychological techniques.  Unless interroga-
tions are recorded and judges
carefully screen confessions for
reliability, seemingly “over-
whelming” evidence may con-
vict the innocent.
JUDGING GUILT
Of 165 exonerees who had
written decisions on appeal or
postconviction, harmless error-
type rulings were pervasive.  In
62% of the cases, judges commented on guilt or found error
harmless.  In 30% of the cases, judges found error harmless.  In
10% of the cases, judges called evidence of guilt “overwhelm-
ing.”   To be sure, some errors truly are harmless.  However,
what I describe in these DNA-exoneree cases is a system in
which they had little incentive to claim innocence: all who
brought innocence claims before obtaining DNA testing lost.
They had few incentives to challenge the reliability of the evi-
dence at their trials: despite clear problems with eyewitness
procedures used, outright invalid forensics (another subject of
my book, which I do not discuss here for lack of space), and
the problems described with the confessions, many did not
challenge central evidence at trial, and few had any success. 
MISSING EVIDENCE
It has come to light in a host of these exonerees’ cases that
evidence that went missing or that was concealed by law
enforcement could have supported their claims of innocence
at trial.  Violations of Brady v. Maryland may be far more com-
mon than we would like to think: I came across dozens of
cases in which exculpatory forensics had been uncovered only
after the exoneration, or the fact that eyewitnesses were hyp-
notized, or deals with informants, and other crucial evidence
of innocence.  
One high-profile case highlights the importance of ensuring
careful preservation and disclosure of evidence.  The U.S.
Supreme Court did not hear most of these DNA exonerees’
appeals or habeas petitions claims, but it did rule on 38 certio-
rari petitions filed by these innocent people. It summarily
denied each of these petitions without giving reasons, except
Larry Youngblood’s. In Youngblood’s case, the Court heard oral
arguments and issued a written opinion explaining why it
rejected his claim that he should receive a new trial because
law enforcement failed to properly preserve biological evi-
dence from the crime scene.21 Twelve years later, DNA tech-
nology had improved enough that the very evidence that had
been degraded through law enforcement’s negligence was now
testable. The DNA tests exonerated Youngblood and matched
another man.  The State of Arizona spent more than $109,000
to keep him behind bars for six and a half years, while the true
perpetrator remained free. The DNA test that freed him cost
$32.22
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BETTER JUDGING INNOCENCE
The truth is humbling.  These DNA exonerees’ cases looked
strong at the time.  Many of us would have convicted these
defendants had we been the jurors.  Yet judges are uniquely
positioned to prevent evidence from contamination that may
make the weak appear strong and allowing fiction to replace
truth.  Social science research may increasingly help to identify
ways to improve the accuracy of evidence at criminal trials.23
Rulings like those from the New Jersey Supreme Court and the
Oregon Supreme Court, and state legislation and efforts at the
local level to improve the accuracy of evidence collected early
on in criminal investigations, may prevent the tragic miscar-
riage of justice in our courtrooms. 
DNA testing cannot be used in the vast majority of criminal
cases.  These 250 exonerations (now there have been more
than 300 such DNA exonerations) are just the tip of a larger
iceberg.  However, we do not know which seemingly innocu-
ous routine cases today will be proven false tomorrow.  The
DNA exonerees’ cases provide a set of cautionary tales:  we
need to more rigorously screen the evidence and adopt more
accurate and better-documented investigative procedures.  If
evidence is contaminated very early in an investigation, it may
be impossible to undo the damage at trial or postconviction.
Unless judges take on a more active role as gatekeepers to
insist on improved practices, however, the same contaminated
confessions, suggestive eyewitness misidentifications, flawed
forensics, and false informant testimony will continue to cause
wrongful convictions.  
Upon vacating convictions, trial judges have often offered
the newly exonerated an apology.  In James Waller’s case, the
judge said: “On behalf of any and all public officials at that
time, I want to apologize.”24 Nobody can give back to these
people the years they lost.  But what we can do is work hard to
make sure that it does not happen again.
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